 (7 Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1993;56:2 15-219) 
The Capgras delusion is the most common of the delusional misidentification syndromes (DMI). It is characterised by patients insisting that known people have been replaced by impostors, robots or others who impersonate the original individual. Since its first systematic description by Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux' it has been reported frequently and universally.2 3 Many attempts have been made to account for the delusion, ranging from the Freudian analytic;4 through psychodynamic notions focussing on ambivalent emotions;56 to neuropsychiatric explanations implicating chronic brain lesions;79 or more transient cortical dysfunctions. [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] The present work was motivated partly by the belief that the neuropsychological approach is likely to yield greater dividends than any purely psychological attempt to explain the Capgras delusion. It was also Christodoulou, Lambis Papageorgiou, designed to extend other work aimed at exploring neuropsychological techniques for evaluating DMI.'3 '4 More properly this approach, perhaps, should be termed cognitive neuropsychiatry. ' This experiment was designed to investigate any anomalies of functional cerebral asymmetry in patients with the Capgras delusion compared with paranoid schizophrenics matched by age On each trial the subject's task was to fixate a small central cross. Then the stimuli were exposed for 200 ms, which is the maximum duration before eye movements may occur, and the subject was required to press one keyboard button for the decision "same" and another for the decision "different". Practice trials were given beforehand thoroughly to familiarise him with the procedure. The order of drawings trials and faces trials was randomised across subjects so that half received drawings first and half received faces first. The designated keys for decisions "same" and "different" were similarly counterbalanced. Within a block of trials the position of stimuli (LVF, RVF or bilateral) occurred randomlythus preventing the subject from anticipating the kind of stimulus arrangement.
Both the stimulus presentation and response recording were carried out using a Macintosh portable computer programmed automatically to record response times (RTs) and errors. The principal dependent variable was RT to correct decisions. Each block comprised 40 trials, half of which involved identical stimuli and half where the pairs were different. Subjects were clearly instructed that not only could they not anticipate where the stimuli would fall relative to the fixation point, but that the sequence of "same" and "different" pairs was equally unpredictable. They were encouraged to make fast and accurate responses.
Results
The RT data for correct responses are tabulated in table 2. The results are also illustrated in figs 2 and 3 for the drawings stimuli and faces stimuli, respectively. The entire data were first analysed by a three-way analysis of variance (group x stimulus type x visual field). The data from three experimental and three matched controls differ significantly only when stimuli were faces. When line drawing of objects were target stimuli the only notable pattern was that the control group were all Our data, however, pose as many problems for Cutting's ideas as they provide support for it. The three control patients, each diagnosed as schizophrenic, revealed a perfectly normal cerebral asymmetry for face recognition which Cutting's theory would not predict. Moreover, results with object stimuli failed to reflect Kosslyn's"7 speculation that the left hemisphere is specialised to recognise categories rather than individual examples of a category. According to this approach a RVF/left hemisphere advantage could have been expected in determining whether two objects (that is, two different categories) are the same or different. The data did not bear this out.
The fact that all three Capgras patients responded fastest to faces presented bilaterally, however, is not consistent with an elementary analysis of Joseph's8 position. A logical initial prediction from his view that the delusion occurs because there is some impediment to the cross-hemisphere integration of facial representations is that any such difficulty should be reflected in slower responses to bilateral stimuli. Clearly, this did not happen. Even ignoring the bilateral stimuli advantage for Capgras subjects, their mean response time for these trials (816 ms) is essentially identical to that produced by the control group (808 ms). Thus the present data are consistent with Joseph's hypothesis only if the dysfunction is present at more distal levels of association cortex involved in higher level cognitive information processing.
Our study serves to underline the likely advantages to be derived from adopting a cognitive neuropsychiatric approach to the study of the Capgras delusion. In particular it illustrates that a fairly simple experimental paradigm can yield data that may help to distinguish the competing accounts of this disorder.'5 25 26 Accordingly, further efforts aimed at examining in more detail the role of impairment in the right hemisphere in the aetiology of the Capgras delusion are warranted and should be encouraged. However, the possibility of left hemisphere9 or bilateral involvement8 still cannot be dismissed at this stage. The fact that the most recent results indicate that in some respects brain pathology in schizophrenics is more evident in the right compared with the left hemisphere,24 gives some general and indirect support to our findings. It is, however, unlikely that schizophrenia can be localised to one side or one part of the brain, nor can one anticipate that even a relatively simple symptom such as the Capgras delusion will eventually be localised to one area.
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